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Conventional wisdom says that the American-style class action will 
never go global.  Even as some countries develop innovative ways to 
handle enormous cases—from Netherland’s settlement-only approach to 
mass torts1 to Japan’s recent adoption of class actions2—a number of 
factors have slowed their growth abroad.  Such barriers include: (1) bans 
on contingency fees, (2) “loser-pay” rules that increase the financial risk 
of complex litigation for plaintiffs, and (3) collective actions that, in 
many cases, require that all parties affirmatively “opt-in” to participate.3  
These features of collective actions will continue to limit the incentives, 
stakes, and finality of large settlements forged overseas.4 
This resistance reflects, in some ways, what some say is the uniquely 
“bottom-up” nature of American litigation.5  In “top-down” justice 
                                                          
*  Professor of Law, Loyola School of Law, Los Angeles.  Thanks are due for insightful 
conversations with Jack B. Weinstein, Kenneth R. Feinberg, Samuel Issacharoff, David Jaros, Dana 
Remus, Jay Tidmarsh and all of the members of the University of Kansas Law Review Symposium 
on the 50th Anniversary of the Modern Class Action.  
 1.   James M. Newland, Brian P. Moher & Jason W. Reynar, A Touch of Dutch: Group Actions 
in the Netherlands, 6 CLASS ACTION 394, 395–96 (2012). 
 2.   Michael J. Madderra, Comment, The New Class Actions in Japan, 23 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 795, 808 (2014) (describing class action law in Japan that went into effect in December 
2016).  See also Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and 
Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 307 (2011) [hereinafter Hensler, The 
Future of Mass Litigation] (noting that at least twenty-one countries have some type of “class 
action”); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American 
Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21–25 (2009) [hereinafter Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation]. 
 3.   Manning Gilbert Warren III, The U.S. Securities Fraud Class Action: An Unlikely Export 
to the European Union, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1084–90 (2012); see also Samuel Issacharoff & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 192–97 
(2009) (noting that the relationships between counsel, parties, and courts in European systems would 
be markedly different than in American class actions); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under 
Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
401, 401–03 (2002). 
 4.   See OSCAR G. CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 390–400 
(Oscar G. Chase & Helen Hershkoff eds., 2007) (observing the American class action system 
through a comparative perspective); CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND 
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE 
REDRESS IN EUROPE 1–3 (2008). 
 5.   See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377–80 
(2007) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact] (“What really sets the United States apart 
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systems outside the United States like those, for example, in Europe, 
South America, and Asia,6 government actors often compensate victims.  
The U.S. system, by contrast, traditionally has relied on individuals and 
their private attorneys to prosecute claims against corporations and 
others to obtain compensation, while satisfying other socially valuable 
goals, like deterrence and corrective justice.7 
Although some question whether the United States truly follows a 
“bottom-up” approach,8 another global trend in complex litigation is 
emerging.  The “bottom-up” approach of the United States, in fits and 
starts, has begun to converge with other countries’ “top-down” approach 
in aggregate litigation.  The new United States model of complex 
litigation now “involves many different players—class action lawyers, 
agencies, prosecutors, nonprofits, and other institutions”— in some 
cases, competing to “prosecute the same defendant, for the same 
conduct, and with power to compensate victims on a massive scale.”9  
Increasingly, state attorneys general, federal prosecutors, agencies, and 
legislative compensation funds compensate large groups of victims like 
class actions.10  Large institutions, like large mutual funds and state 
                                                          
is the fact that its basic regulatory model is ex post rather than ex ante, a form of regulation that 
draws heavily on its common-law tradition.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private 
Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 955 
(2001) [hereinafter Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts]. 
 6.   See, e.g., HODGES, supra note 4, at 3; Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of 
People for Inflicted Harms, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 165, 176–77 (2001) [hereinafter 
Weinstein, Compensating]. Large Numbers]; Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts, 
supra note 5, at 955. 
 7.   See, e.g., Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, supra note 5, at 377–80; Robert Reich, 
Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is In, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), 
http://prospect.org/article/regulation-out-litigation (“‘Regulation’ is a bad word.  So how are these 
regulatory issues being handled?  Through lawsuits.”). 
 8.   See Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L. 
REV. 1, 12–14 (2001) (describing ways United States complex litigation informally mimics civil law 
jurisdictions); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823, 858–61 (1985) (describing similarities between United States complex litigation and managerial 
approach of German courts). 
 9.   Adam S. Zimmerman, Mass Settlement Rivalries, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 413 (2013) 
[hereinafter Zimmerman, Mass Settlement Rivalries]. 
 10.   I have discussed these trends in a series of recent articles, which I draw from heavily in 
Part II.A of this article.  See Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement 
Mill, 101 VA. L. REV. 129 (2015) [hereinafter Remus & Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement 
Mill] (describing rise of judicial decisions and regulatory policies that encourage corporate mass 
dispute resolution systems to compete with class actions); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. 
Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2012) (describing the rise of 
federal agency based settlement funds and recommending reforms adopted from complex litigation); 
Adam S. Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1393 (2015) [hereinafter 
Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements] (describing presidential administrations that coordinate and 
consolidate the resolution of massive disputes); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 
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retirement systems, have also taken a larger leadership role in class 
action lawsuits themselves, relying on changes to United States securities 
laws in the 1990s.11  In many cases, the end result is a large fund 
managed by the same private administrators who commonly oversee 
class action settlements.12 
Now, the same is happening outside the United States.  When the 
United Kingdom amended its class action procedures, it also expanded 
its own Financial Service Authority’s power to seek consumer redress 
under the 2010 Financial Services Act.13  As Sweden, Norway, Japan and 
Denmark adopted class action procedures over the last decade, they also 
expanded the authority of state agencies, consumer associations, and 
other non-governmental organizations to bring “representative actions” 
                                                          
N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Distributing Justice] (tracing the rise of federal 
agency based settlement funds); Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class 
Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1385 (2011) [hereinafter Zimmerman & Jaros, The Criminal Class 
Action] (tracing the rise of massive criminal restitution funds in deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements between corporate defendants and federal prosecutors). 
 11.   The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2012)), provides that the lead plaintiff—the class member 
with the largest claimed loss who seeks the position—shall select and retain counsel to represent the 
class.  15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb)-(v) (2012).  David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” 
Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 2031, 2032–39 (2010) (comprehensively studying public and private institutions after the 
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, or PSLRA). 
 12.   The FTC, for example, regularly uses four claim agents with substantial experience 
administering class action settlements, including Rust Consulting, Epiq Systems, Analytics 
Consulting, LLC, and Gilardi & Co., LLC. Consulting.  See Recent FTC Cases Resulting in 
Refunds, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/refunds (last visited Apr. 8, 
2017) (listing awards and claim administrators in recent mass refunds).  On July 15, 2013, the SEC 
approved up to nine firms from which “future fund administrators will be appointed to administer 
the distribution of disgorgement or fair funds.”  Delegation of Authority to Director of the Division 
of Enforcement, 78 Fed. Reg. 46,498-01 46,498 n.1 (Aug. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
200).  Before that, in 2010, the United States Attorney and the Security Exchange Commission chose 
Kenneth R. Feinberg, well known for his experience in private class actions and mass tort 
settlements, to oversee a $225 million fund for defrauded stockholders.  Liza Mundy, Special Master 
Kenneth Feinberg is a Mediator’s Mediator, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/13/AR2010011304638.html?hpid=features1&hpv=national.  And back 
in 2002, the SEC selected Frances E. McGovern, another well-known mass tort scholar and 
administrator, to oversee payouts to investors from the nation’s largest investment banks.  See SEC 
v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404 n.1 (S.D.NY. 2009); Press Release, SEC, SEC, NY 
Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement To 
Reform Investment Practices; $1.4 Billion Global Settlement Includes Penalties and Funds for 
Investors (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm. 
 13.   See infra Part I.B.  See also Christopher Hodges, Developments in Collective Redress in 
the European Union and United Kingdom, GLOB. CLASS ACTIONS EXCH. 5–6 (2010), 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/1010%20Class%20Actions%20U
K%202010%20Report.pdf. 
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on behalf of victims.14  Public authorities continue to play an active role 
in large collective actions in common law systems, like Canada and 
Australia, and civil law systems, like Brazil.15 
The convergence of “top down” and “bottom-up” approaches to 
settling large-scale problems—from the BP Oil Spill to the international 
response to Volkswagen’s scandal over emission “defeat devices” in its 
cars—raises a host of new questions for the future. Is it fair for 
prosecutors or agencies, whose primary goals are criminal punishment or 
regulation, to coordinate with private attorneys who seek to compensate 
victims?  In those countries with federal systems, how should the federal 
government coordinate with states or provincial authorities? 
But “convergence” also presents substantial challenges for judges 
charged with overseeing different people and institutions, all with 
different state, institutional or personal interests in a final resolution.  
How should a judge coordinate or consolidate such cases, if at all?  In a 
world where courts must reconcile competing interests of lawyers, 
victims, public investors, and local, national and multinational 
government bodies—each with their own private, regulatory, and 
criminal enforcement objectives—what level of deference does the court 
owe to each decisionmaker in that settlement?  In short, the global 
convergence of public and private attorneys commencing overlapping 
actions creates new pressures on what countries want and expect from 
their courts. 
                                                          
 14.   See infra Part I.B; see also, e.g., 5 § LAG OM GRUPPRÄTTEGÅNG (Svensk 
författningssamling [SFS] 2002:599) (Swed.) (Swedish Group Proceedings Act § 5); Lov om 
mekling og rettergang i sivile tvister (tvisteloven) 17. juni 2005 nr. 90 § 35-3(1)(b) (Nor.) 
(Norwegian Dispute Act, Ch. 35, § 35-3(1)(b)); Robert Gaudet, Jr., Earth to Brussels: Lessons 
Learned from Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Dutch Class Actions for the European Union 
Debate on Collective Redress (June 2, 2008) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Stockholm University), 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/lawlibrary/library/GaudetRobert_thesisJune102008.pdf; Madderra, 
supra note 2, at 806–08 (describing creation of creation and certification of Qualified Consumer 
Organizations, which are certified by the Prime Minister and given power to sue on behalf of large 
groups of consumers in a multi-stage process). 
 15.   See, e.g., 2015 Enforcement Report, CANADIAN SEC. ADM’R 17 (2015), 
https://www.securities-administrators.ca/uploadedFiles/CSA_ER2015_En.pdf (showing 
$111,651,429 in total restitutionary awards for provincial and territorial securities regulators in 
2015); Annual Report 2015–16, AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INV. COMM’N, 38 (Oct. 14, 2016), 
http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4058626/asic-annual-report-2015-2016-complete.pdf [hereinafter 
ASIC ANNUAL REPORT] (highlighting that “[i]n 2015–16, our actions contributed to over $125.9 
million being refunded or compensated”); Antonio Gidi, The Recognition of U.S. Class Action 
Judgments Abroad: The Case of Latin America, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 893, 917–18 (2012) 
(observing that Brazilian class actions initiated by the office of the public prosecutor are “similar to 
parens patriae standing and associational standing in the United States”). 
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This article argues that as government actors assume a more 
prominent role in mass dispute resolution, courts will also play an 
important part in the deals they reach.  In many countries, judges are 
charged with overseeing different state and individual actors involved in 
massive settlements.16  And despite the variety of judicial approaches 
around the world,17 in such complex cases, courts may be the only 
institution able to hear disparate but overlapping claims by public 
authorities and private parties.  Courts may also be in a unique role to 
ensure that public and private parties effectively police one another as 
they take steps to reach an overarching settlement.  Borrowing 
innovative approaches from district court judges in the United States, this 
article explores how countries can adopt measures designed to assist 
judges in coordinating massive settlements between law enforcement and 
a variety other interest groups. 
Part I outlines the way that the United States and many other 
jurisdictions are converging on a governmental approach to the 
compensation of mass claims.  The evolving response of public actors to 
resolve private disputes reflects two different trends.  In the United 
States, as victims’ rights advocates successfully encouraged government 
lawyers, agencies, and legal reformers to adopt a more “victim-centered” 
justice system, government actors aggressively fought for victim 
compensation when they settled with corporate wrongdoers.  Outside the 
United States, reformers have pushed for greater public involvement in 
mass settlements for a different reason—to avoid America’s infamous 
“litigation culture” by placing public actors at the forefront of resolving 
massive disputes.  These converging strategies, across the globe, have 
                                                          
 16.   HODGES, supra note 4, at 33 (charting required judicial review of 22 out of 25 European 
Union member states). 
 17.   Judicial review of government actions has varied significantly around the world, as well as 
over the course of United States history.  See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, Regulation and the Courts: 
Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: 
UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS 275-286 (Francesca Bignami & David 
Zaring eds., Edward Elgar 2016) (summarizing comparative literature on judicial review of 
administrative agencies); Michael Asimow & Lisl Dunlop, The Many Faces of Administrative 
Adjudication in the European Union, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 144 (2009) (describing different levels 
of judicial and administrative review across European Union member states); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative 
Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 946–53 (2011) (providing a background on nineteenth century 
administrative law); Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of Administrative Action: A 
Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2248 (2011) [hereinafter Mashaw, 
Rethinking Judicial Review] (“The nineteenth century federal courts and federal administrative 
agencies were not in a partnership.  They operated in separate spheres. Courts either decided 
questions de novo on records made in court, or they effectively declined jurisdiction.”). 
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created an opportunity for government officials to fashion compensation 
schemes for large classes of victims. 
Part II highlights the conflicts presented when multiple public and 
private actors seek overlapping remedies in mass litigation.  In many 
cases, government officials will confront the same problems private 
actors face when they manage complex cases—coordinating cases across 
different jurisdictions, ensuring adequate participation, overcoming 
conflicts of interest with victims, and distributing funds fairly.  As 
government actors increasingly seek remedies in litigation that 
compensate people for widespread harm, judges will have to make 
difficult decisions about whom to defer to about appropriate settlement 
awards and proposed structural reforms. 
Part III argues that this new “convergence” of public approaches to 
mass litigation presents a new challenge for judges.  In many countries, 
courts may be one of the few institutions able to hear disparate, but 
overlapping, claims commenced by public authorities and private parties.  
Accordingly, Part III explores some ways that countries may adopt 
measures to assist judges charged with coordinating massive settlements.  
Borrowing from the United States experience, I suggest that courts 
should enjoy power to (1) conduct joint hearings involving related 
actions, (2) coordinate procedures to ensure fair notice and participation, 
and (3) review settlement agreements to ensure that government and 
private actors justify the difficult trade-offs they make in a global 
settlement. 
I. GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS 
Over the past decade, the United States and many foreign 
jurisdictions have been converging on a new role for government actors 
in mass litigation.  Much like the emerging scholarship in regulation—
where commentators have identified that public and private actors share 
“regulatory space”18—public and private actors increasingly share 
                                                          
 18.   See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1173–81, 1209–11 (2012); Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple 
Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 78–82 
(2012); Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193, 
2234–35 (2012); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 198–218 (2011); 
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 617–18 (2000).  
Scholars are also paying more attention to state-federal coordination.  See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, 
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in 
Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 554–60 (2011); Margaret H. Lemos, State 
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The sums in such public settlements have yet to reach the totals 
brokered in large class actions and other private aggregate settlements, 
but they increasingly are becoming a substantial source of mass 
compensation in the United States.  Over the past decade, federal 
agencies recovered billions on behalf of misled investors and 
consumers.28  In their most recently published annual reports, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) claimed over $4 billion in 
disgorgement awards for injured investors, while the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) announced over $2 billion (including a $1.2 billion 
judgement against a single defendant).29  The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) announced over $200 million in just the 
first six months of 2016.30  Defenders of the CFPB frequently note that, 
over its short existence, it has restored “nearly $12 billion to 
homeowners, students, servicemen and servicewomen, car buyers, credit 
card holders, and other borrowers.”31 
                                                          
in FTC history”). 
 26.   Well before President Obama encouraged BP to agree to its historic multibillion dollar 
compensation scheme, see Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, supra note 10, at 1395–97, it paid 
over $53 million into a victim restitution fund to settle criminal price fixing charges with federal 
prosecutors.  See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 8, United States v. BP Am. Inc., (No. 07 CR 
683) (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2007) (on file with author). 
 27.   Liz Moyer, Wells Fargo to Pay $1.2 Billion in Mortgage Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/04/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-to-pay-1-2-billion-in-
mortgage-settlement.html?_r=0; Press Release, CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines 
Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized 
Accounts (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-
opening-unauthorized-accounts/ (announcing separate multimillion dollar settlements with CFPB, 
Office of Comptroller of Currency, and City and County of Los Angeles). 
 28.   Zimmerman, Mass Settlement Rivalries, supra note 9, at 383 n.6 (tracing the rise of federal 
agency-based settlement funds, which collected over $10 billion over the past decade). 
 29.  U.S. SEC, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ii (2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2016.pdf#contents [hereinafter SEC FY 2016 REPORT] 
(“The program continued its impressive record this year by filing 868 enforcement actions, the most 
in the SEC’s history, and by obtaining orders for more than $4 billion in penalties and 
disgorgement.”); FTC, 2015 ANNUAL HIGHLIGHTS, STATS & DATA (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/node/943403 (touting awards of $2 billion in consumer redress and 
disgorgement, including $1.2 billion recovery against Cephalon for injured purchasers).  These totals 
only reflect aggregate awards; actual distributions to consumers are much lower.  The FTC, for 
example, distributed $22 million in 2015 to 844,036 consumers.  Id.  The SEC reported that it had 
“held for distribution” over $3.1 billion to distribute to investors, but the report does not detail how 
much investors actually received in 2016.  See SEC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 30, at 106. 
 30.   CFPB,  SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SPRING 2016 11 (2016), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/semi-annual-report-spring-2016/. 
 31.   See, e.g., Editorial Bd., Mr. Trump Goes After Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/opinion/mr-trump-goes-after-
consumer-financial-protection-bureau.html.  Over $7 billion went to “principal reductions, cancelled 
debts, and other consumer relief” as a result of its enforcement actions.  CFPB, Factsheet, By the 
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Federal prosecutors have similarly recovered billions from corporate 
criminal defendants. Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack 
Obama created joint task forces designed to coordinate many different 
government bodies—all charged with recovering assets on behalf of 
wronged businesses, investors and homeowners that have now surpassed 
$40 billion.32  Even the new Trump administration appears poised to 
reach a settlement that would forgive millions in loans for students lured 
into attending a for-profit college.33  If finalized, it would become one of 
the largest “debt forgiveness schemes” for students in United States 
history.34 
As I have discussed elsewhere,35 the increasing willingness of public 
attorneys to seek mass compensation reflects three distinct developments 
in the United States.  The first was the development of the victims’ rights 
movement in the 1970s.  As victims’ rights advocates lobbied public law 
institutions to create “a more victim-centered justice system,”36 federal 
                                                          
Numbers 1 (2017),  http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_CFPB-By-the-
Numbers-Factsheet.pdf.  The CFPB collected $3.7 billion in monetary compensation.  Id. 
 32.   President Barack Obama’s 2012 State of the Union Address, for example, announced three 
new task forces, all responsible for obtaining mass relief for large groups of victims.  See Barack 
Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union 8 (Jan. 24, 2012) 
(transcript available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200048/pdf/DCPD-
201200048.pdf).  Some examples include a $13 billion settlement distributed to injured investors 
and a $2 billion settlement to be distributed to victims of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.  See Ben 
Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Extracting Deal from JPMorgan, U.S. Aimed for Bottom 
Line, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, at A1; Danielle Douglas, Government Extracts $2 Billion in Fines 




 33.   Shahien Nasiripour, Trump May Give Students Debt Relief that Obama Refused, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-13/trump-may-
give-students-debt-relief-that-obama-refused (observing that “[u]nder a preliminary accord, the 
federal government would invite tens of thousands of former students, who more than 20 years ago 
attended beauty and secretarial schools owned by defunct Wilfred American Education Corp., to 
petition the Education Department to cancel their unpaid debt”).  To be fair, it is unclear whether the 
settlement talks reflect a change of position between presidential administrations, as this article 
suggests, or simply the parties’ reappraisal of the strength and weaknesses of this particular case.  
And according to a report by BuzzFeed News, at the time this article was going to press “the 
Education Department said it has not approved a single fraud claim since the day of Trump's 
inauguration, while thousands of students already promised forgiveness are still waiting.” Molly 
Hensley-Clancy, 18 States Are Suing Betsy DeVos Over For-Profit College Rules, BuzzFeed News, 
(July 6, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/mollyhensleyclancy/19-states-are-suing-betsy-
devos?utm_term=.ltExGO9xy#.cdK5JMR56 
 34.   Id. 
 35.   See supra note 10. 
 36.   Zimmerman & Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, supra note 10, at 1394.  The Mandatory 
Victim Restitution Act of 1996, for example, “was hailed as part of a move ‘toward a more victim-
centered justice system,’ which would help transform a criminal justice system that Congress 
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and state officials have been “encouraged—and sometimes required—to 
seek victim compensation.”37 
Second, large corporate scandals prompted officials across federal 
and state executive departments—the Justice Department,38 federal 
agencies,39 state attorneys general,40 and state agencies41—to shift their 
focus from punishing individual offenders to using coordinated 
enforcement actions to reform business practices.  This evolving public 
strategy created new opportunities to compensate “large classes of 
victims harmed by wealthy corporate criminals.”42 
Third, government restitution programs reflect a broader trend in 
corporate dispute resolution.43  Worried about risky, “bet-the-company” 
litigation, business advisors and corporate defense attorneys have 
embraced mediation and other out-of-court approaches to resolve big 
cases.44  Government actors, in turn, have taken into account those 
                                                          
believed was ignoring the plight of victims.”  Matthew Dickman, Comment, Should Crime Pay?: A 
Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 
1688–89 (2009) [footnotes omitted]. 
 37.   Zimmerman & Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, supra note 10, at 1394; Dickman, supra 
note 37, at 1689 n.20 (quoting Congressman Foley, who at the time observed, “[f]or far too long we 
have forgotten the innocent victims of crime.”). 
 38.   See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 
(2007) (describing the rise of a “new settlement approach” to avoid “collateral consequences of an 
indictment, while using the prosecution as a ‘spur for instutitonal reform’”); Memorandum from 
Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys 4 
(Jan. 20, 2003), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_
privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf  [hereinafter Thompson Memo] (“Indicting corporations for 
wrongdoing enables the government to address and be a force for positive change of corporate 
culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, discover, and punish white collar crime.”); Policy 
Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,820-03, 45,822 
(Aug. 4, 2003) (“[S]ituations can arise, for example, when significant aggregate consumer injury 
results from relatively small individual injuries not justifying the cost of a private lawsuit, or when 
direct purchasers do not sue.”). 
 39.   See, e.g., SEC, PUTTING INVESTORS FIRST: 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 6 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2009.pdf#sec1 (observing the SEC’s 
primary goals are to “take prompt action to halt the misconduct, sanction wrongdoers effectively, 
and, where possible, return funds to harmed investors”). 
 40.   See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public, supra note 22, at 488–91. 
 41.   Berdejo, supra note 23 (manuscript at 6). 
 42.   Zimmerman & Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, supra note 10, at 1394. 
 43.   See, e.g., Remus & Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, supra note 10, at 131–32 
(describing rise of corporate alternative dispute systems that respond to mass harm); Dana A. Remus 
& Adam S. Zimmerman, Aggregate Litigation Goes Private, 63 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1318 (2014) 
(describing similar trends) [hereinafter Remus & Zimmerman, Aggregate Litigation Goes Private]. 
 44.   See generally Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2275, 2276–80 (2017) [hereinafter Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement] (describing widespread 
use of settlement techniques, including “bellwether mediation,” to resolve mass litigation without 
trial); Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 548–50 (2016) 
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settlement programs in many areas,45 including most recently, a series of 
settlements by Volkswagen to buy back cars following revelations that it 
deceived regulators with its emission technology.46  In such cases, 
government actors rely on the corporate defendant’s ability to efficiently 
enter into repeat deals, with boilerplate terms, to respond to large 
numbers of claims.47 
As public-based litigation grows, cutbacks on class actions have also 
brought United States systems closer to European and other countries. 
Samuel Issacharoff, Geoff Miller, Richard Nagareda, and others describe 
how new limits on complex litigation procedures have, for better or for 
worse, brought the United States closer to other judicial systems hostile 
to American style class actions.48  Linda Mullenix also describes the 
ironic enthusiasm of political conservatives for a series of reforms 
embodied in the proposed Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, 
that attempted to draw the American legal system closer to its European 
counterparts—including product liability reform, limits on punitive 
damages, and additional limits on attorney fee calculations.49  That trend 
                                                          
(describing wide variety of ways corporations resolve consumer disputes through privatized dispute 
resolution); Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and 
Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014) (describing corporate adoption of alternative dispute systems). 
 45.   Remus & Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, supra note 10, at 144–48, 146 n.75. 
 46.   See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, Class Action Settlements Require Volkswagen to Repair or 
Buy Back 3.0 Liter TDI Diesel Vehicles (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/02/federal-trade-commission-class-action-settlements-require (stating that, under one 
settlement, Volkswagen consumers were “eligible to receive approximately $26,000 to $58,000 for a 
buyback, depending on the model, mileage, and trim of the car”).  The United States Justice 
Department, the Environmental Protection Agency, and United States Customs and Border 
Protection also entered into separate plea agreements and civil settlements with Volkswagen.  See 
Press Release, EPA, Volkswagen Clean Air Act Civil Settlement (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/volkswagen-clean-air-act-civil-settlement.  Finally, fourty-four 
state attorneys general collected over $600 million on behalf of Volkswagen consumers in their 
states. Amanda Bronstad, State AGs Secure Groundbreaking Environmental Settlement With 
Volkswagen, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 30, 2017), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202782557011/State-AGs-Secure-Groundbreaking-
Environmental-Settlement-With-Volkswagen. 
 47.   See Remus & Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, supra note 10, at 146; Remus 
& Zimmerman, Aggregate Litigation Goes Private, supra note 44, at 1318–21 (describing different 
ways policymakers and agencies regulate corporate dispute resolution); D. Theodore Rave, 
Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J. TORT L. 91, 92–94 (2012) (describing the rise 
and use of mandatory arbitration and private settlement systems); Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative 
Mechanisms: Mass-Claims Resolution Without Class Actions, 63 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1293–1302 
(2014) (describing arbitration and corporate settlement systems designed to avoid class action 
litigation). 
 48.   Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 3, at 192–97; Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 
2, at 21–25; Sherman, supra note 3, at 401–03. 
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resolve complex cases—from the Rule 23 class action to the opt-in 
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act to multiparty 
procedures in multidistrict litigation.53 
Many have described the rapid spread of representative and 
aggregate procedures abroad over the past decade.54  Representative and 
aggregate procedures to resolve massive disputes now exist in more than 
thirty-five countries.55  Most vary considerably from the “United States 
model,” which permits contingency fees, allows punitive damages, and 
precludes subsequent lawsuits to those who do not “opt-out” of the class.  
They also vary considerably among each other: some limit standing to 
public bodies or private associations the government has preapproved to 
commence an action.56  But in the majority of jurisdictions, as Deborah 
Hensler observes, “no party has a monopoly over representative 
litigation,” and “consumers, investors, businesses” may all pursue 
lawsuits on behalf of others without worrying that certain causes of 
action “may offend a government in power.”57  Rules may also differ 
over how aggregate lawsuits are financed, the level of court oversight 
over any potential settlement, whether parties must affirmatively opt in 
to the lawsuit to participate, as well as whether aggregate litigation is 
“trans-substantive” or, instead, limited to a few discrete areas of law—
like securities, anti-trust, or consumer fraud. 
                                                          
EXISTING COLLECTIVE REDRESS SCHEMES IN EU MEMBER STATES 38–39 (2011), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110715ATT24242/20110715AT
T24242EN.pdf [hereinafter Directorate General] (noting European Member States have adopted four 
general types of collective redress: “group and representative actions, test case procedures and 
procedures for skimming off profits”). 
 53.   See Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at 
the State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 48 n.3 (2007) (demonstrating the extent to which the 
MDL statute has been instrumental in disposing of complex cases). 
 54.   See, e.g., Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation, supra note 2, at 307–11; Rachael 
Mulheron, Recent Milestones in Class Actions Reform in England: A Critique and a Proposal, 127 
L.Q. REV. 288, 289 (2011); Christopher Hodges, Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model, 29 
CIV. JUST. Q. 370, 370 (2010); Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 
28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 164–79 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking 
Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 302–03 (2010); Hensler, The Globalization of 
Class Actions, supra note 52; Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress 
Procedures—European Debates, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 379, 380 (2009); Francesco Rizzuto, Does 
the European Community Have Legal Competence to Harmonise National Procedural Rules 
Governing Private Actions for Damages for Infringements of European Community Antitrust Rules?, 
2 GLOBAL COMPETITION LITIG. REV. 29, 29–30 (2009); Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 3; 
Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 2; Mullenix, American Exceptionalism, supra note 50. 
 55.  Deborah R. Hensler, From Sea to Shining Sea, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(“Today, at least 35 jurisdictions in addition to Australia, Canada and the United States, including 21 
of the 25 largest economies in the world, permit class actions for some or all legal claims.”). 
 56.   Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions, supra note 52, at 14. 
 57.   Id. 
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But despite the variety of aggregate procedures that exist around the 
world, they share two important features.  First, all have converged 
around developing procedures to peacefully and efficiently resolve large 
numbers of diffuse claims that arise in an increasingly interconnected 
global marketplace.  Second, despite the different judicial systems, roles 
and cultures in former Communist bloc countries, civil law and common 
law jurisdictions,58 many imagine some place for their courts to review 
the overarching fairness adequacy of a massive settlement.59 
These trends have not gone unnoticed.  A number of international 
conferences have assessed the extent to which countries around the world 
have been converging on a model of aggregate litigation.  In the process, 
commentators have highlighted three ways that aggregate litigation has 
converged on a new model inside and outside the United States.  First, 
since the 1980s, commentators compared American judges’ hands-on 
approach to complex litigation to managerial judicial approaches in 
Germany and other civil law jurisdictions.60  Second, commentators have 
compared U.S. cutbacks on class actions, in Congress and appellate 
courts, to other countries’ general distaste for American entrepreneurial 
litigation.61  Finally, as set out above, commentators have documented 
how other countries have tentatively begun to adopt United States 
complex litigation procedures to resolve large numbers of similar 
claims.62 
                                                          
 58.   Coffee, supra note 55, at 345 (“Although the United States emphasizes checks and 
balances, Europe (including the United Kingdom) places greater faith in legislative supremacy, and 
thus it is uncomfortable with an activist style of judicial review, which it fears as antidemocratic.”). 
 59.   HODGES, supra note 4, at 33 (charting required judicial review of twenty-two out of 
twenty-five European Union member states); EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Resolution of 2 February 
2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress’, 2012 O.J. C 239E, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-
0021&language=EN&ring=A7-2012-0012 (last updated May 3, 2013) [hereinafter Towards a 
Coherent European Approach] (recommending strong judicial role to police adequacy of settlement) 
(last updated May 3, 2013).  Notably, however, the EU has not gone as far as some American 
administrative settlement schemes, like the FTC, which require judicial review of all settlements 
reached under the Tunney Act. 
 60.   See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 8, at 858–61; Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in 
Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 337–41 (1986). 
 61.   See, e.g., Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 3, at 181–91; Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation, 
supra note 2, at 6–8. 
 62.   See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm’n, Green Paper on Consumer Collective 
Redress—Questions and Answers (Nov. 27, 2008), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-
741_en.htm (describing attempts by thirteen member states to adopt class action procedures without 
elements that made up the American “toxic cocktail”).  But see, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, The 
Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 640 & 
n.79 (2010) (arguing that the term “toxic cocktail” is misleading). 
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But there’s one form of convergence that has been less discussed.  
Just as the United States increasingly relies on public actors to settle with 
corporate wrongdoers and distribute funds like other forms of complex 
litigation, the same trend has been increasingly taking hold abroad.  
Great Britain’s primary securities and antitrust regulators now enjoy 
formal powers to collect restitution for victims of securities and financial 
fraud, much like the SEC, FTC, and the CFPB.63  In 2013, the United 
Kingdom announced that the new competition enforcement authority, the 
Competition and Markets Authority, would also enjoy this new 
regulatory redress power.64  More recently, the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (“ASIC”) touted its own deal to refund 216,000 
bank customers $80 million “for failing to apply fee waivers, interest 
concessions and other benefits since 2008.”65 
Similarly, public bodies, agencies, and ombudsmen in Brazil, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Finland,66 were also vested with 
powers to seek mass restitution.  In Germany, which has relied on private 
associations to commence litigation on behalf of large groups of 
consumers since 1896,67 public bodies now may commence large 
aggregate proceedings.68  Finally, even as the European Union 
recommends uniform procedures to member states to respond to billion 
dollar cross-border disputes, like the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(“LIBOR”) scandal,69 it has recommended that public bodies, regulators, 
                                                          
 63.   HODGES, supra note 4, at 21–22 (describing the “significant extension of the 
responsibilities” of the British Financial Service Authority and the Office of Fair Trading to pursue 
“compensation orders” in complex cases). 
 64.   Press Release, Comp. & Mkts. Auth., New Competition Authority Comes Into Existence 
(Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-competition-authority-comes-into-
existence. 
 65.   See ASIC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 38. 
 66.  Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 311, 382–83 (2003) (comparing Brazilian system to parens patriae cases and other government 
actions in the United States); HODGES, supra note 4, at 28–29; Klaus Viitanen, Enforcement of 
Consumers’ Collective Interests by Regulatory Agencies in the Nordic Countries, in COLLECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW: SECURING COMPLIANCE IN EUROPE THROUGH PRIVATE GROUP 
ACTION AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY INTERVENTION 81, 83 (Willem H. van Boom & Marco Loos eds., 
2007) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT]. 
 67.   HODGES, supra note 4, at 14. 
 68.   See Hans-W. Micklitz, Collective Private Enforcement of Consumer Law: The Key 
Questions, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 67, at 13–15. 
 69.   Lianna Brinded, EU Prepares Class Action Lawsuits Against Libor and Oil Price Fixing 
Cartels, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 7, 2013), http://m.ibtimes.co.uk/eu-price-fixing-libor-oil-probe-gas-
475861. 
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and prosecutors take charge of commencing actions against corporate 
wrongdoers on behalf of large groups of victims.70 
Perhaps the reason why this kind of convergence between the United 
States and foreign approaches to mass litigation has received less 
attention is because it seems so unremarkable.  Friedrich Hayek long ago 
recognized that civil law jurisdictions in Europe, South America, and 
Asia have distinguished themselves from common law jurisdictions like 
the United States, by relying on centralized forms of public 
administration to govern.71  Unlike the United States judicial system, 
where judges may spontaneously develop innovative legal rules to 
respond to new cases and problems, many civil law jurisdictions 
generally accept and rely upon the expertise and perceived legitimacy of 
rules developed through a centralized bureaucratic state.72  Robert Kagan 
also famously compared the “particularly American” reliance on lawyers 
and judges to regulate—what he calls “adversarial legalism”—with 
centralized bureaucratic approaches used around the world.73  Because 
class actions allow non-state actors to assume the collective 
responsibility that civil law systems have traditionally reserved 
exclusively for the state, it perhaps should not be surprising that 
European systems would simultaneously increase the power of public 
authorities to accomplish mass compensation.74 
Nevertheless, the powers conferred on public enforcers are 
remarkable for at least two reasons.  First, these are new formal powers 
that represent part of the same reform effort designed to adapt collective 
redress procedures from the United States.75  Second, while jurisdictions 
                                                          
 70.   Towards a Coherent European Approach, supra note 60; see also Rizzuto, supra note 55, 
at 29–30. 
 71.   See 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 95 
(1973); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 503, 504 (2001) (“In general, Hayek believed that the common law was associated 
with fewer government restrictions on economic and other liberties.”). 
 72.   HAYEK, supra note 72, at 95; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 275–76 (2003) (analogizing Hayek’s “spontaneous order” theory to the theory of 
natural selection); Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 3, at 209. 
73 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW IX (2003).  
 74.   Indeed, all European countries have long recognized “piggy-back” actions on criminal 
prosecutions.  Since the 1960s, public prosecutors and certified private associations have enjoyed 
power to seek injunctive relief on behalf of diffuse groups of consumers and investors.  The growth 
of such public forms of redress was sparked by the same pressures that led to dramatic changes for 
private group litigation in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966—the rise of Western 
Consumerism and mass production.  See HODGES, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
 75.   Christopher Hodges, Fast, Effective and Low Cost Redress: How Do Public and Private 
Enforcement and ADR Compare?, in COMPETITION LAW: COMPARATIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS ACROSS THE EU 255, 267 (Barry Rodgers, ed. 2014) [Hereinafter 
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outside the United States often rely on centralized administration to 
regulate, they have not historically relied on those administrative bodies 
to “regulate by deal”76—using litigation and settlements to establish 
policy and compensate large groups of people.77  Third, as discussed 
above, many reform efforts imagine that courts will play a role in 
overseeing the ultimate fairness of that large settlement.78 
As set forth below, the use of public actors to provide private 
compensation may face some of the same structural problems as private 
forms of mass compensation—agency costs, inefficiencies, and 
distributional problems.  These concerns, in turn, place increasing 
pressure on judges who must oversee such cases. 
II. OBSTACLES TO PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS 
The following section highlights the conflicts presented when 
multiple public and private actors seek overlapping remedies in mass 
litigation.  A vast amount of literature has been devoted to highlighting 
the problems of coordination, participation, fairness, and conflict in class 
action litigation.79  For that reason, as countries adopt similar procedures 
                                                          
Hodges, Fast Effective and Low Cost Redress] (observing that “[t]he involvement of a public 
enforcement authority in the payment of compensation is a relatively new technique”). 
 76.   Steven M. Davidoff & David T. Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response 
to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 465–70 (2009) (outlining their model of “regulation 
by deal,” a process by which government bodies forge deals with individual firms in order to 
influence their conduct).  Steven M. Davidoff Solomon & David T.  Zaring, The Dealmaking State: 
Executive Power in the Trump Administration 2 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 
2921407, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921407 (considering 
consequences “if deals [become] a principal mechanism for the promulgat[ion] of government 
policy, overseen by an executive who promises to be the dealmaker in chief?”). 
 77.   Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, supra note 5, at 377–80 (comparing United State’s 
ex-post approach to regulation to other countries’ ex-ante approach). 
 78.   HODGES, supra note 4, at 33 (charting required judicial review of 22 out of 25 European 
Union member states); Towards a Coherent European Approach, supra note 60 (recommending 
strong judicial role to police adequacy of settlement). 
 79.   See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 
371, 419 (2001) (characterizing class action settlements as large business transactions that exchange 
bundles of legal rights for money); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort 
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1348–49 (1995) (observing that “[n]o opening 
generalization about the modern class action is sounder than the assertion that it has long been a 
context in which opportunistic behavior has been common . . . . If not actually collusive, non-
adversarial  settlements have all too frequently advanced only the interests of plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
not those of the class members.”) (footnote omitted); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class 
Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
1573, 1616 (2007) (arguing that modern procedural due process in class actions is insufficient to 
protect the class members’ right to litigate autonomously); Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 376, 425 (1982) (arguing that the shift to large class action settlements transforms the 
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settlement fund with money “from the same wrongdoer[s],” on behalf of 
the overlapping beneficiaries, “often run by [the] same administrators, 
for the same kinds of harm.”81  Such rivalries between public and private 
actors raise some of the same problems once observed in the United 
States before the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act—where 
attorneys competed in different state courts to certify class actions for 
overlapping groups of people.82 
For example, a year after private attorneys commenced class actions 
against the UBS alleging that it had cheated a large number of non-
profits and municipalities, state attorneys general also settled with the 
same defendants and created a large settlement fund for the same set of 
victims.83  Private attorneys cried foul, arguing the defendants’ rush to 
settle with government lawyers created a race to the bottom that 
undermined their own settlement efforts.  Said one private attorney: 
“[t]hat’s what happens when you have two different processes . . . the 
defendant can pick door number one or door number two.”84 
                                                          
 81.   Zimmerman, Mass Settlement Rivalries, supra note 9, at 387–88 (collecting examples of 
competing public and private settlements involving the same “wrongdoer” in a wide variety of 
cases).  See also Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
285, 293, 330 (2016) (discussing complications when public and private actors seek overlapping 
compensation).  Duplicative private and public compensation and enforcement are a problem, but 
should not be overstated.  The CFPB, for example, identified 740 enforcement actions by state and 
local regulators, and in “88% of those cases, [was] unable to find an overlapping class action 
complaint.”  CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD FRANK 
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a)  17–18 (2015), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.  In 
her empirical examination of over 240 SEC “fair fund” compensation schemes, Urska Velikonja 
found that “in more than half of the fair fund distributions—53.2%—defrauded investors did not 
receive compensation in parallel securities litigation.”  Velikonja, supra note 20, at 371. 
 82.   Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 515 (1996) 
(observing that “[t]he consolidation of many claims into a single proceeding, which typifies the 
large-scale class action, creates still another vexing problem: the filing in different jurisdictions of 
numerous class actions based on a single transaction or occurrence”); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling 
Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462–63 (2000) (detailing problems of waste in dueling class 
actions).  Competitive class actions still exist, but theirs numbers dropped after the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 allowed defendants to remove state class actions to federal court with minimal 
diversity.  Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012)) 
(granting federal jurisdiction over interstate class actions where the amount in controversy exceeds 
$5 million and at least one plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of different states). 
 83.   Nate Raymond, Plaintiffs Lawyers in Muni Bond Derivative MDL Object to UBS Bid-
Rigging Settlement, THE AM. LAW. (May 11, 2011),  
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202493650539?id=1202493650539&slreturn=2017030312491
0.  Government attorneys, in response, argued parallel class action litigation frustrated state 
sovereign interests.  Nate Raymond, NY AG Office to Plaintiffs Lawyers: Stay Out of Our Bid-
Rigging Cases, THE AM. LAW. LITIG. DAILY (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202493791095/NY-AG-Office-to-Plaintiffs-Lawyers-Stay-Out-
of-Our-BidRigging-Cases?slreturn=20170303125241. 
 84.   Zimmerman, Mass Settlement Rivalries, supra note 9, at 382. 
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Second, government actors may seek funds against the same 
insolvent defendant under conflicting standards of fairness.  Some 
creditors entitled to receive money in a potential bankruptcy may be very 
different than the “victims” defined in criminal law.85  The government 
may not be able to share information about how to locate assets or 
victims with the trustee in a parallel civil proceeding without 
jeopardizing a criminal investigation.  Worse yet, the dueling 
compensation systems may produce fights over how to distribute limited 
assets without any formal process for handling those disputes. 
Take Bernard Madoff.  After prosecutors finally exposed his 
decades-long ponzi-scheme, two separate funds were established to 
compensate his victims.  One grew out of civil bankruptcy proceedings, 
while the other was grounded in the criminal law of restitution and 
forfeiture. In the first fund, “The Madoff Recovery Initiative,” Irving 
Picard served as a SIPA trustee in a court-appointed bankruptcy, 
successfully collecting over $9.5 billion and distributing out $5 billion.86  
In the second, prosecutors appointed Richard Breeden to oversee a multi-
billion dollar criminal restitution fund.87  Breeden, however, complained 
that many of the beneficiaries to Picard’s fund did not deserve the 
money.  The  Madoff Recovery Initiative, he noted, too often paid hedge 
funds and other claims traders who purchased the right to pursue their 
claims at a steep discount from direct victims.88  Unlike his fund, 
“widows and orphans” would not get  “one thin dime” from Picard’s 
fund.  Breeden’s concerns reflected the different purposes of 
compensation in bankruptcy, which is to orderly resolve an 
organization’s outstanding debts, and criminal law, which narrowly 
defines “victims” as only those proximately hurt by crime.89 
                                                          
 85.   Some victims of fraud, entitled to compensation under a criminal restitution process, may 
also be third party-defendants in clawback action by a bankruptcy trustee in a parallel proceeding.  
See Draft Report, WORKING GROUP ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME, AM. BAR ASS’N, ASSET FORFEITURE 
AND BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY (Apr. 9, 2014) (on file with author). 
 86.  Diana B. Henriques, Broader Pool of Madoff Victims to Benefit From Fund, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2013, 5:43 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/18/compensation-fund-set-for-
feeder-fund-victims-in-madoff-scheme/. 
 87.  Jordan Maglich, Additional $2.35 Billion Available for Madoff Victims - But There’s a 
Catch, Forbes, Nov. 25, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanmaglich/2013/11/25/additional-2-
35-billion-available-for-madoff-victims-but-theres-a-catch/#7ae5c413654d. 
 88.   Henriques, supra note 6. 
 89.   Id.  For these reasons, specialists in Bankruptcy worry that criminal restitution funds 
disrupt bankruptcy’s comprehensive “priority” scheme, which commercial creditors depend upon 
when providing loans.  As a result, commercial creditors in bankruptcy are supposed to obtain funds 
with the same priority as the direct victims of a fraud.  Karen Gebbia, Debt and Crime: Inevitable 
Bedfellows the Intersection of Fraud, Bankruptcy and Asset Forfeiture, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
525, 534–35 (2012) (describing the conflict between “absolute priority” scheme in bankruptcy and 
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These competing definitions of fairness—who is a victim under civil 
and criminal law—also may complicate efforts to achieve a final, orderly 
resolution.  Following a $2.6 billion government settlement with JP 
Morgan to compensate Madoff’s victims, criminal prosecutors 
distributed $1.7 billion penalty themselves to their “victims,” while the 
bankruptcy trustee, Irving Picard, received a separate settlement for $543 
million.90  To this day, few rules exist to determine whether money 
collected by a federal prosecutor should go to a bankruptcy fund, 
criminal restitution fund, or both. 
Third, many government actors lack experience gathering accurate 
information, as well as guidelines to solicit input from private claimants 
and victims.  As a result, there have been some cases where government 
officers grossly miscalculate victim awards.  For example, in 2010, Tom 
Petters was sentenced to fifty years in prison for a multi-billion dollar 
Ponzi scheme that wiped out savings for hundreds of his investors.91  
After the district court received large numbers of objections to the 
prosecutor’s distribution plan, the court found that the government’s 
proposal was riddled with errors, which in some cases, lead to revisions 
that dropped multi-million dollar claims without any explanation.92  Even 
agencies with more experience in victim compensation, like the SEC, 
frequently deny parties a voice in the formation of a distribution plan, 
limit parties’ ability to intervene to challenge distributions, and overlook 
divergent interests in the award.93 
To be sure, some private administrators appointed to oversee public 
restitution funds will reach out to potential stakeholders.94  Those efforts 
                                                          
criminal restitution).  Some also observed that, because the criminal restitution fund sought to 
compensate so many more direct victims, it has taken much longer to distribute funds.  See David 
Voreacos & Erik Larson, Why Is the U.S. Still Sitting on $4 Billion in Madoff Money?¸ BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-05/why-is-the-u-s-still-sitting-on-4-billion-in-
madoff-money (last updated Feb. 5, 2016, 5:12 PM) (quoting the special master’s observation that “I 
can’t just wave a wand”). 
 90.   Aaron Smith, JPMorgan’s $2.6 Billion Madoff Reckoning, CNNMONEY (Jan. 8, 2014, 
7:33 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/07/news/companies/jpmorgan-madoff-settlement/.  The 
remaining $350 million went to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.  Id. 
 91.   Annalyn Censky, Tom Petters Gets 50 Years for Ponzi Scheme, CNNMONEY (Apr. 8, 
2010, 3:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/08/news/economy/Tom_Petters/. 
 92.   United States v. Petters, Crim. No. 08-364, 2010 WL 2291486, at *1–2 (D. Minn. June 3, 
2010).  We discuss the Petters case in more depth at Zimmerman & Jaros, The Criminal Class 
Action, supra note 10, at 1425. 
 93.   Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 10, at 546–47. 
 94.   The administrator in Computer Associates, Kenneth Feinberg, highlighted his philosophy 
for doing so, noting that such input was necessary to gather information vital to the distribution plan: 
“I have a substantive challenge: What should the formula be for the distribution? But I also have a 
mechanical challenge of how best, in a cost-effective way, to get the money out to eligible claimants 
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will likely improve as the SEC, FTC, and other agencies increasingly use 
and evaluate claim administrators with experience in private class action 
settlements.95  However, no formal rules require those administrators to 
hear from people or involve them in a distribution plan.96  Such 
oversights, in turn, can complicate the distribution process and, in some 
cases, add to the total cost of resolving claims. 
Fourth, public actors charged with settling claims may experience 
their own conflicts of interests.  Like private class counsel, government 
settlements may insufficiently account for the interests of diverse 
claimants.97  Government actors may also experience their own conflicts 
with victims—settling quickly to avoid embarrassing headlines about 
oversights in their investigations, enforcement actions, or regulatory 
policies.  Following the revelation of a series of financial scandals on 
Wall Street, Judge Jed S. Rakoff famously rejected a proposed multi-
million dollar settlement between the SEC and Bank of America.98  
Rakoff had harsh words for the agreement, pointing out that the SEC 
“gets to claim that it is exposing wrongdoing on the part of the Bank of 
America in a high-profile merger,” while Bank of America acceeds to 
settlement as the cost of doing business.99  Underscoring the “cynical” 
relationship between the public actors and the private defendant, Rakoff 
concluded: “[a]nd all this is done at the expense, not only of the 
                                                          
and how best to cut checks.”  Gretchen Morgenson, Giving Away Lots of Money Is Easy, Right?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/13/business/yourmoney/giving-
away-lots-of-money-is-easy-right.html?_r=0. 
 95.   See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The SEC, for example, must continually 
evaluate performance of each administrator under its own regulations.  Delegation of Authority to 
Director of the Division of Enforcement, 78 Fed. Reg. 46,498-01 46,498 n.1 (Aug. 1, 2013) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200).  (“Each administrator in the pool will be evaluated annually by the 
Office of Distributions and, if performance is deemed in compliance with the requirements for 
selection, will be continued in the pool for another year, up to a total of five years, at which time a 
selection process for a new pool will take place.”). 
 96.   Even in criminal cases, courts may play a very limited role.  For example, Petters involved 
a criminal conviction, where victims were able to object, and the court was authorized to review, the 
government’s victim restitution plan.  United States v. Petters, Crim. No. 08-364, 2010 WL 
2291486, at *1–2 (D. Minn. June 3, 2010).  However, when the government does not prosecute in 
exchange for a defendant’s agreement to a fund, there may be no judicial review.  Victims can object 
to “deferred prosecution agreements” in court, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(2), 3771(a) (2012), but 
even there, judicial involvement is rare—and at such a late stage—victim objections may be too little 
and too late.  Zimmerman & Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, supra note 10, at 1425 n.191. 
 97.   See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 
83 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (confirming that “[s]o 
long as the district court is satisfied that ‘in the aggregate, the plan is equitable and reasonable,’ the 
SEC may engage in the ‘kind of line-drawing [that] inevitably leaves out some potential claimants’”) 
(emphasis added). 
 98.   SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d. 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 99.   Id. 
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shareholders, but also of the truth.”100  After the parties increased the size 
of the settlement, Rakoff ultimately held his nose and signed off on the 
agreement, calling the deal “half baked justice, at best.”101 
Arguably, the most serious conflicts may come into play at the state 
level, where elected government enforcers are vulnerable to capture by 
the businesses they regulate, as they raise money in local elections.  A 
series of news articles in 2014, for example, chronicled contacts between 
state attorneys general and the targets of potential enforcement actions 
that may go entirely unregulated.  Some officials dropped investigations 
or settled actions at discounts shortly after meeting with company 
lawyers at fundraising events.102  More recently, Margaret Lemos and 
Max Minzner detail how state and federal officers occasionally seek 
large monetary awards for other self-interested reasons, like when they 
can retain the proceeds to improve their reputations and fund future 
enforcement actions.103  This kind of “eat what they kill” policy,104 
according to Lemos and Minzner, is an institutional “arrangement that is 
common at the state level” and has begun “to crop up in federal law” as 
well.105  To be sure, the vast majority of agreements between government 
lawyers and businesses involve hard-working lawyers who negotiate 
good faith, arms-length settlements.  But even in these cases, government 
lawyers confront an inherent conflict between their own enforcement 
goals and private victims who rely on them for compensation.106 
                                                          
 100.   Id. 
 101.   Louise Story, Judge Accepts S.E.C.’s Deal with Bank of America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/business/23bank.html?hp&_r=0. 
 102.   Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/us/lobbyists-bearing-gifts-pursue-attorneys-
general.html; Eric Lipton, Link Shows How Lobby Firm Cultivates Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/us/link-shows-how-lobby-firm-cultivates-
influence.html; Eric Lipton, Missouri Attorney General May Face Inquiry over Money from 
Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/us/politics/missouris-
attorney-general-faces-scrutiny.html; Eric Lipton, Rhode Island Investigating Former State Attorney 
General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/rhode-island-
investigating-ex-attorney-general-on-lobbying-rule.html. 
 103.   Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
853, 863 (2014). 
 104.   Id. at 908. 
 105.   Id. at 854. 
 106.   Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public, supra note 22, at 491 (entrusting state attorneys 
general to adequately represent distant victims conflates the “consent of the governed” with the 
“consent of the client”).  Richard Nagareda, for example, explores the conflicts states attorneys 
general experienced settling a historic $248 billion dispute with the tobacco industry.  RICHARD A. 
NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 184–85 (2007) [hereinafter NAGAREDEA, 
MASS TORTS].  Even as they sought to reform egregious practices to reduce the public’s addiction to 
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presents obstacles, he observes, because “EU settlements . . . apply only 
to agreements or commercial practices affecting trade among EU 
member states.”112 
To take one prominent example, European Union regulators 
brokering an historic $2.3 billion settlement arising out of the LIBOR 
rigging scandal lacked the same power to collect funds as British and 
United States regulators against major banks accused of rigging global 
lending rates.113  Among other things, EU regulators were only 
empowered to collect for antitrust violations requiring proof of a 
conspiracy, not the somewhat more lenient standard associated with 
statutory fraud.114  The jumble of substantive and procedural rules for 
collective redress, in light of the LIBOR scandal has, in turn, led to calls 
to standardize procedures for collective redress across the EU.115 
Challenges mount when foreign institutions providing mass 
restitution do not hear from the victims they hope to serve.  Following a 
settlement brokered by United States diplomats, European insurance 
regulators and private insurers, a fund was established to resolve 
insurance claims for thousands of Holocaust victims called the 
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims 
(“ICHEIC”).  In the end, ICHEIC successfully provided over $300 
million to 48,000 Holocaust survivors and their families.116  Along the 
way, however, ICHIEC struggled to compensate victims, just as those 
same plaintiffs pursued separate but related cases in the United States 
courts.117 
One of the reasons why ICHIEC struggled was because it did not 
include private attorneys from the United States litigation in the design 
of its compensation process.  This reportedly had many unfortunate 
                                                          
 112.   Id. at 1031. 
 113.   Chad Bray & Jack Ewing, Europe Sets Big Fins in Settling Libor Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
4, 2013, 8:19 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/e-u-imposes-1-7-billion-euros-in-
fines-over-rate-rigging-scandal/; see also Understanding the Rate-Fixing Inquiry: Tracking the 
Global Investigation into How Big Banks Set Crucial Benchmark Interest Rates, Including Libor, 
N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/16/business/dealbook/20120716-libor-
interactive.html?_r=0 (last updated July 28, 2014) (providing a general overview of the LIBOR 
scandal). 
 114.   See Bray & Ewing, supra note 113. 
 115.   Brinded, supra note 70. 
 116.   Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, supra note 10 at 1429.  For an insightful history of 
the litigation, see MICHAEL R. MARRUS, SOME MEASURE OF JUSTICE: THE HOLOCAUST ERA 
RESTITUTION CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990S (2009). 
 117.   In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
challenges to settlement); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141–43, 167 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding $1.25 billion settlement in Holocaust litigation). 
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consequences—delaying payouts, imposing burdensome evidentiary 
requirements, and generating objections from victims and their 
families.118  As I detail elsewhere, “[c]laim processors struggled to 
identify account holders . . . [relying] on rigorous evidentiary rules that 
often slowed down the claims handling process to a ‘snail’s pace.’”119  
Years after ICHEIC opened its doors, having racked up more than $40 
million in expenses, ICHEIC only offered to settle 1,000 claims out of 
79,000 presented.120  Although ICHEIC hoped to save money and reduce 
acrimony by bypassing victim’s lawyers, the decision to leave out private 
attorneys ironically may have slowed the compensation process, while 
increasing costs.121 
Perceived conflicts of interest between the government and 
individuals also can undermine perceived legitimacy of a public 
compensation fund. In the litigation following the meltdown of the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, parties could obtain 
compensation through one of three alternative procedures: a private 
compensation scheme set up by the operators of the private nuclear 
power plant, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (“TEPCO”); an 
alternative dispute resolution program financed by the Japanese 
government; or private collective litigation.122  In TEPCO’s private 
process, claimants complained of endless forms, arbitrary distinctions for 
emotional distress awards, and a “‘fox guarding the henhouse’ problem 
in entrusting the compensation process to the party they believed to be 
responsible for their harms.”123  In the government process, parties 
                                                          
 118.   Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, supra note 10, at 1427–29. See also Morris A. 
Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-Era Litigation Through the Executive and Judicial Branches, 20 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 212, 230 (2002) (observing that “[n]o court is monitoring the claims process 
to make sure that it is equitable, and plaintiffs’ counsel . . . have been relatively disenfranchised from 
the implementation process by virtue of the fact that they have no formal role”). 
 119.   Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, supra note 10, at 1429.  See also Sidney Zabuldoff, 
ICHEIC: Excellent Concept but Inept Implementation, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 260, 261–64 (Michael Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION]; The Holocaust and Insurance: Too Late, Too Slow, Too 
Expensive, THE ECONOMIST (July 31, 2003),  http://www.economist.com/node/1957197. 
 120.   Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, supra note 10, at 1430.  See also Charles E. Boyle, 
Holocaust Insurance Claims Panel Faces Recriminations over Delays, INSURANCE JOURNAL (Feb. 
11, 2002), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2002/02/11/21936.htm (observing 
that payouts proceeded at a “snail’s pace”). 
 121.   Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, supra note 10, at 1429–30.  See also 
Comprehensive Holocaust Accountability in Insurance Measure, H.R. 1905, 108th Cong. § 2(6)–(8) 
(2003) (criticizing ICHEIC’s process). 
 122.   Eric A. Feldman, Compensating the Victims of Japan’s 3-11 Fukushima Disaster, 16 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 127, 135 (2015) (providing comprehensive case study of collective 
redress after the Fukushima disaster). 
 123.   Id. at 138. 
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claimed government-appointed mediators discounted awards by an 
average of 50% according to unstated guidance.  The result pushed many 
claimants into private litigation, where they faced long delays and 
substantive hurdles to their class claims.124  Even as public compensation 
systems hope to provide more transparent and efficient payouts than their 
private counterparts, in practice, they may also lead to delay, confusion 
and conflict. 
Finally, there are times where victims abroad will possess different 
rights depending upon whether they receive their money from private 
litigation or government action.  The Volkswagen emission litigation has 
proven to be an interesting example.  According to Volkwagen’s most 
recent financial reports, it currently faces class actions and mass actions 
for its “Dieselgate” in fourteen different jurisdictions outside of the 
United States and Canada, including: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, 
Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom.125  At the same time, a series of 
investigations, reviews, and lawsuits were also launched by federal 
regulators and forty-four state attorneys general in the United States, as 
well as regulators in Canada, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom.126  
Finally, German, South Korean, and United States prosecutors 
aggressively pursued parallel criminal investigations, coordinating their 
investigations, issuing arrest warrants and, in some cases, exacting 
multimillion dollar fines and penalties.127 
                                                          
 124.   In March 2017, a district court in Japan became the first court to hold TEPCO and the 
Japanese government negligent for the nuclear disaster.  Motoko Rich, Japanese Government and 
Utility Are Found Negligent in Nuclear Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/17/world/asia/japan-fukushima-nuclear-disaster-tepco-
ruling.html.  Individual awards were paltry, however, compared to the 7 trillion yen (over US $63 
billion) already paid out by TEPCO.  Id.  The court awarded a total of $335,000 to sixty-two 
evacuated residents, for an evarage of $5,400 per person.  Id. 
 125.  Volkswagen AG, 2016 Annual Report, at 194–95 (Feb. 24, 2017). 
 126.  Id. at 194–98. 
 127.  Hyunjoo Jin, South Korea Court Issues Arrest Warrant for VW Official in Emissions 
Scandal, WASH. POST (June 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/south-
korea-issues-warrant-for-arrest-of-vw-official-in-emissions-scandal/2016/06/24/43552e18-3a1d-
11e6-a254-2b336e293a3c_story.html?utm_term=.a6b6b61f7329. These cross-border actions are just 
the tip of the iceberg.  Volkwagen estimates that investors currently seek over 9 billion euros in 
various German regional courts, the Netherlands, Austria and other countries.  Volkswagen AG, 
2016 Annual Report, at 195.  As a result, a number of German regional courts must now coordinate 
and resolve thousands of private class action complaints, see id., as well as parallel actions 
commenced by foreign state actors, including Norway, South Korea, and California.  Jung Suk-Yee, 
Damage Claim Against Volkswagen: South Korea’s NPS to Sue Volkswagen for Damages over 
Emissions Scandal, BUSINESS KOREA (Sept. 30, 2016), 
http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/money/16068-damage-claim-against-volkswagen-
south-korea%E2%80%99s-nps-sue-volkswagen-damages-over.  Some commentators argue that such 
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The variety of public and private actions against a single defendant 
like Volkswagon has produced complex rivalries and inconsistent 
outcomes for similarly situated victims around the world.  After the 
FTC’s $10 billion settlement with Volkswagen to buy back cars from 
American consumers, EU officials pressed to get a similar deal for 
European consumers.  The EU has, however, been stymied by 
inconsistent regulatory approaches among its member states.128  On the 
private litigation front, an American law firm teamed up with a third-
party litigation funder, MyRight.de, to obtain monetary relief for an 
estimated 20,000 people.129  Because MyRight’s business model takes 
one-third of what it can recover from plaintiffs, much like a standard 
contingency fee arrangement, the lawsuits only can ask for damages in 
individually coordinated cases.130  Nevertheless, should the EU prevail 
upon Volkswagen to settle, it could use the threat of injunctive relief to 
get a deal that would provide Volkswagen owners with new cars.  Some 
observe that this is a more valuable remedy that the parties could not 
otherwise obtain in their privately-financed actions.131 
                                                          
inconsistent approaches may lead to particularly unfair results for investors outside the United States 
who suffer the same harm.  Érica Gorga, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nonfinancial Firms: 
The Case of Brazilian Corporations and the ‘Double Circularity’ Problem in Transnational 
Securities Litigation, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 131, 137 (2015) (arguing that, as a result of 
inconsistent private and public enforcement approaches “Brazilian investors bore most of the costs 
of the settlement payments to U.S. investors” in securities litigation against two leading Brazilian 
companies). 
 128.   Stephanie Bodoni & Karin Matussek, EU Steps Up Pressure on VW in Bid for Bigger 
Consumer Payouts, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-20/vw-said-
to-face-coordinated-pressure-from-eu-consumer-groups (last updated July 20, 2016, 8:24 AM).  In 
one interesting development, the EU went so far as to charge individual member states, like 
Germany, the United Kingdom,  and Spain, for failing to take steps to adequately sanction 
Volkswagen.  See Catherine Stupp, Commission Takes Legal Action Against Seven EU Countries 
over VW Scandal, EURACTIV.COM, http://www.euractiv.com/section/transport/news/commission-
takes-legal-action-against-seven-eu-countries-over-volkswagen-scandal/ (last updated Dec. 9, 2016). 
 129.   Karin Matussek, Volkswagen Proving More Reliable in Court Than on The Road, 
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-16/volkswagen-is-proving-more-
reliable-in-court-than-on-the-road (last updated Mar. 16, 2017, 7:20 AM). 
 130.   Karin Matussek, German Court Deals Setback to VW Compensation Plan, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 13, 2017) (observing that “My-Right’s business model is taking a third of what it can recover 
for plaintiffs, so the lawsuits are asking for damages. New cars wouldn’t help My-Right.de as it 
would have to find a way to monetize them”) (on file with author). 
 131.   Id.  At the time of this writing it appears that administrative authorities in Europe may be 
getting closer.  In March 2017, the European Commission hosted a meeting of 22 consumer 
protection authorities from across the continent.  Theo Leggett, VW Diesel Compensation is On 
Track in US But Not Elsewhere, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
39255554.  They agreed to take “collective action” to put pressure on Volkswagen to provide 
compensation to million of European consumers.  Id.  This included “co-ordinated fines on 
Volkswagen for alleged breaches of consumer law,” and making a joint “administrative decision,” 
which could be used to support litigation against the company in national courts across Europe.  Id. 
2017 GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF GLOBAL SETTLEMENTS 1081 
III. DEVELOPING A JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO SETTLEMENT CONVERGENCE 
Despite the variety of judicial approaches around the world, judges 
in common law and civil jurisdictions are placed in a unique role in mass 
public and private settlements.  Even if the judge will not necessarily be 
in a position to know when a settlement is substantively fair in such 
cases, a judge’s control over the administration of the case can shape a 
final settlement in important ways. 
Complex litigation scholars and federal judges have long 
recommended that a single judge ideally should handle overlapping 
claims arising in massive disputes.132  But as disputes move across 
jurisdictions—involving regulatory and enforcement arms of different 
nations—such consolidation may not be possible absent international 
treaties or protocols.  Still, judges will require tools to review the 
ultimate fairness of a mass settlement, particularly where the process 
may (1) arise in jurisdictions subject to differences in procedure, 
substantive law and culture; (2) take place on parallel tracks, where 
public or private parties may fail to communicate with courts about 
another proceeding that could impact the fairness of a pending 
settlement; and (3) require the court to review motion practice and 
settlements to assure public and private actors to enter into arms-length 
deals. 
While this Article cannot solve all of the problems that arise in mass 
public settlements, some of United States judicial experiments in large 
private and public settlements offer a way forward.  Many include 
innovations designed to increase communication among judges and 
parties in mass disputes, where regulators, non-governmental 
organizations and private parties may otherwise fail to do so.  This next 
part describes three potential reforms and innovations that courts may be 
able to observe, despite differences in judicial systems: (1) joint judicial 
hearings, (2) coordinated case management orders and notice procedures 
between regulators and parties, and (3) limited judicial review to require 
government actors explain the difficult trade-offs that they may make a 
mass settlement. 
                                                          
 132.   Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers, supra note 6, at 169.  (“Aggregation reduces 
the burdens of multiplicative litigation and allows a single judge to develop a greater familiarity with 
the case.”); Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821, 
1826 (1995) (describing “consensus” case management approach to mass torts, including judicial 
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class members.137  In rival government and private litigation over 
municipal derivatives,138 for example, plaintiffs successfully petitioned 
the district court to review settlement notices. Private attorneys alleged 
that the state attorneys general settlement asked claimants to waive their 
rights against the same defendants in the class action litigation they had 
commenced.139  The court rejected the state attorney general’s argument 
that the court could not interfere with their sovereign interests in defining 
the final settlement terms of their agreement. “In the face of these 
concerns,” the court observed, “BoA and the Settling States respond, 
essentially, ‘trust us.’”140 
The Court ultimately emphasized its independent obligation to 
“protect the integrity of the potential class and the administration of 
justice.”141  The court’s duty to regulate communications with class 
members did not change just because the defendant “engaged in third-
party negotiations with a sovereign state.”142  However “pure the 
intentions of the Settling States maybe,” a court “must ensure” notices 
from the multistate settlement contain “‘objective, neutral information’ 
about the nature” of the private settlement, including “the potential 
remedies available[] and the consequences of electing to opt out of the 
putative class.”143 
Courts also can avoid unnecessary duplication and confusion by 
informally coordinating across jurisdictions.  For example, after Eli Lily 
reached a $1.2 billion settlement with thousands of plaintiffs suffering 
from diabetes and other ailments associated with Zyprexa,144 federal 
prosecutors sought $1.4 billion in restitution in a separate criminal 
                                                          
 137.   See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 499 F. Supp. 2d 415, 418 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 224 F.R.D. 555, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Given the 
potential for abuse or confusion, a district court has “both the duty and the broad authority to 
exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel 
and parties.”  Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981); Erhardt v. Prudential Grp., Inc., 629 
F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980) (“It is the responsibility of the court . . . to safeguard [class members] 
from unauthorized, misleading communications from the parties or their counsel.”). 
 138.   Hinds Cty. v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 620 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing 
the litigation’s background). 
 139.   Hinds Cty. v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 790 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 140.   Id. at 134. 
 141.   Id.. 
 142.   Id. at 135. 
 143.   Id. (citing Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Am., 751 F.2d 1193, 1203 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 144.   See Zimmerman & Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, supra note 10, at 1388.  Press 
Release, Eli Lilly & Company, Lilly and Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Enter into Agreements to Settle 
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David Jaros and I recently explored similar questions—assessing a 
wide variety of aggregate settlements reached in United States civil, 
administrative, and criminal law.148  We canvass several possible 
approaches to judicial review.  First, judges could follow the traditional 
approach to adjudication, deciding the narrow questions presented by a 
limited number of disputing parties, on a case-by-case basis.149  Second, 
judges could embrace more expansive “public law models” of 
adjudication, often associated with United States structural reform 
litigation, where a court actively manages groups of stakeholders in town 
hall-like proceedings to facilitate large global settlements.150  Third, 
judges could tie judicial review to their “comparative institutional” 
competence—in each setting, carefully assessing whether courts, 
officials, or legislatures are better equipped to democratically hear and 
resolve problems among different people.151 
We conclude that, at a minimum, judicial review should exist to 
“alert and press” organizations—private associations of lawyers, 
government attorneys and public bodies—to improve the way they settle 
cases.152  This kind of review would not mean substituting the parties’ 
negotiated outcomes with what a judge thinks is best.  Rather, judicial 
review would exist to produce: (1) more information about “the parties’ 
competing interests in settlement,” (2) greater involvement “by outside 
                                                          
 148.   David M. Jaros & Adam S. Zimmerman, Judging Aggregate Settlement, 94 WASH. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 8–24) [hereinafter Jaros & Zimmerman, Judging Aggregate 
Settlement], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897217. 
 149.   Lon Fuller is often associated with this model of adjudication.  See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, 
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 86 (Kenneth I. 
Winston ed., 1981); LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 705–08 (temp. ed. 1949); 
Donald G. Gifford, The Constitutional Bounding of Adjudication: A Fuller(ian) Explanation for the 
Supreme Court’s Mass Tort Jurisprudence, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 1154–56 (2012).  But see Robert 
G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution 
and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995) (critiquing the view that Fuller 
advocated for a narrow model of adjudication). 
 150.   Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 
1302 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39 (1979). 
 151.   Neil K. Komesar, Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and Institutional Choice, 
1997 WISC. L. REV. 465, 465–66. NEIL K. KOMESAR,  IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
 152.   In so doing, we draw from a long line of scholarship that evaluates the role of courts in the 
lawmaking process and apply them to settlement practice.  See, e.g., Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. 
Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE. L.J. 350, 410 
(2011) (approving of court decisions in global warming cases noting that “in the face of many 
twenty-first century harms, however, ‘pluralism’ requires not only multiple values, but also multiple 
institutions.”); David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
88 VA. L. REV. 1229 1232–33 (2002) (suggesting, in criminal procedure, that courts use “strategies 
designed to promote ongoing dialogue between the judiciary on the one hand and the political 
branches on the other”). 
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stakeholders,” and (3) reasoned justifications “for the trade-offs made by 
the counsel on behalf of similarly situated parties.”153 
In the United States, this kind of “information-forcing” approach has 
a long history.  American courts have long responded to the growth of 
administrative systems, like class actions and federal agencies, by asking 
them to supply good reasons for the critical choices they make.154  Since 
the New Deal, the United States’ response to the rise of the 
administrative state has been to rely on lawyers—subjecting federal 
agencies to legal norms, evaluating their conduct according to reason, 
and holding them accountable through judicial review.155  Although some 
commentators worry these trends impose unforeseen costs on 
regulation,156 judicial review still plays an important role by improving 
information and analysis in modern bureaucracies.157 
Commentators have imagined a similar information-forcing role for 
courts that hear class actions and other forms of mass litigation, 
expressly drawing on courts’ experience with public bureaucracies.158  
Over twenty years ago, Richard Nagareda suggested that just as courts 
must promote deliberation in administrative agencies, they should do so 
                                                          
 153.   Zimmerman & Jaros, Judging Aggregate Settlement, supra note 144, at 5–6. 
 154.   Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in Complex 
Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 384, 401 (2007) (“The fight over the competence of the federal courts to 
oversee quasi-administrative agencies is a reenactment of the early twentieth century battle over the 
ability of the legislature to delegate tasks to administrative agencies.”). 
 155.   DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES 
IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 7 (2014) (describing the “adverse but not implacably hostile bar” working 
to ensure the administrative state operated fairly); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for 
Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 720 (2016) (noting Ernst’s account shows how 
reformers tamed the administrative state, “in large part by ensuring that lawyers would remain an 
integral part of the administrative process”). 
 156.   Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1412 (1992). 
 157.   See Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “with Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the 
Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1605 (2015) (“In theory, judicial review 
ensures that the agency bases its decision on a reasoned analysis of relevant information.”); Matthew 
C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 
755–56 (2006); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (holding an agency must offer a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made”) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 158.   NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS, supra note 106, at 262–64 (adopting “hard look” review to 
mass tort fee negotations); Richard Nagareda, Turning From Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 899, 945 (1996) [hereinafter Nagareda, Turning From Tort to Administration]; Lahav, supra 
note 154, at 401–32 (“Judicial approval of quasi-administrative agencies should never be automatic, 
and this principle should probably extend to aggregative settlements, as well as class actions and 
bankruptcies.  Instead, in approving the creation of claims administration facilities, judges should 
look at these facilities as an extension of their own work and as a kind of public entity.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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for the large private bureaucracies of attorneys who resolve class action 
settlements.159  Andrew Bradt and Teddy Rave recently have taken this 
“information forcing” approach a step further—suggesting that courts in 
complex multidistrict litigation should do more than just promote the 
flow of information between parties.160  They argue that courts, like 
learned intermediaries, can certify the quality of settlements for their 
beneficiaries.161  In any event, as public and private actors provide 
overlapping forms of compensation, judges may be pressed to assure 
injured parties that the compensation they receive was the result of an 
informed, coordinated and fair process. 
It remains to be seen how much the United States experience with 
public settlements will become a model for judges overseeing similarly 
complex cases around the world.  First, judges abroad may not face the 
same kinds of problems or pressure because of important differences in 
their collective redress rules.  As set out in the introduction, other 
jurisdictions impose substantial financial risks on private litigants who 
pursue class action-like remedies.  For these reasons, the kinds of 
disputes that have surfaced between public and private actors in United 
States litigation may never materialize in jurisdictions that impose 
obstacles to private litigation. 
Second, in some cases, public actors may establish claim facilities 
with targeted defendants entirely outside of any court-supervised 
process.162  Even when a court-supervised process exists, in many 
countries, a separate, specialized administrative body or court may exist 
to review the agency’s action, which may hesitate to coordinate with 
judges tasked with hearing private claims.163 
                                                          
 159.   See, e.g., Nagareda, Turning From Tort to Administration, supra note 158, at 945 (arguing 
courts should use “hard look review” in class action settlements to “guard against precisely the kinds 
of infidelities that lie at the core of the agency cost problem in administrative law”). 
 160.   D. Theodore Rave & Andrew D. Brandt, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6) (“[T]he judge 
should use the MDL process to force the disclosure of information to allows the parties in MDL 
cases to make informed decision about whether to accept proposed settlements.”), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2828461. 
 161.   Id. at 28 (noting that “[h]aving developed a degree of expertise in the litigation, the judge 
is in a better position to process that information.”). 
 162.   See, e.g., Hodges, Fast Effective and Low Cost Redress, supra note 75,  at 263–67 
(describing public actors in Europe that encourage private claim settlement facilities); Frederic 
Jenny, Worst Decision of the EU Court of Justice: The Alrosa Judgment in Context and the Future of 
Commitment Decisions, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 701, 723 (2015) (highlighting rise of EU 
settlements without any judicial review). 
 163.  See, e.g., Bignami, supra note 17, at 276 (observing that, one of “the first and most 
enduring contrasts that has been drawn” is “judicial review of administrative action by the ordinary 
courts in the English common law” tradition and by “special bodies” that are “connected to the 
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Third, in civil law jurisdictions, there is significantly less willingness 
for judges to experiment with judicial power or to challenge 
administrative determinations.164  To the extent civil law judges already 
defer to other government bodies, perhaps those judges will feel less 
pressure to confront the challenges public settlements have presented to 
many United States courts. 
But those differences should not be overstated.  First, “information-
forcing” approaches to judicial review are gaining traction, and some 
jurisdictions have long embraced the idea that administrative systems 
should give reasons and explain the tradeoffs they make.165  Second, as 
discussed above, trends outside the United States are changing, 
particularly as civil jurisdictions manage large dockets and review more 
administrative actions.  Finally, administrative settlement practices 
continue to spread.  For example, shortly after the EU began settling 
large numbers of antitrust cases, a number of other European countries 
followed suit,166 including France, Belgium, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom.167  As all of these trends converge, judges may soon confront 
the problems of coordination, information, and conflict only beginning to 
surface in public settlements in the United States. 
                                                          
executive branch” in French tradition). 
 164.   Coffee, supra note 55, at 345 (“Although the United States emphasizes checks and 
balances, Europe (including the United Kingdom) places greater faith in legislative supremacy, and 
thus it is uncomfortable with an activist style of judicial review, which it fears as antidemocratic.”); 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1296 (1994)  (highlighting limited judicial review in Germany’s administrative 
law observing “to German democratic theory, political actors do an adequate job of monitoring 
bureaucratic policymaking activities”). 
 165.  See, e.g., Eduardo Jordão & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review of Executive 
Policymaking in Advanced Democracies: Beyond Rights Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) 
(comparing approaches to judicial review of administrative action and  recommending that judicial 
review “concentrate on the administrative process, notably by enforcing a widespread duty to give 
reasons and by assuring generous rights of participation”); Jenny, supra note 162, at 720 (observing 
rise of EU settlements and noting “when it comes to highly technical or economic assessments . . . 
the courts limit themselves to assessing whether the evidence is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions. In other words, they limit themselves to controlling the internal consistency of the 
decision”); Jürgen Schwarze, Judicial Review of European Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 93 (2004) (“The obligation to give reasons serves the aim of effective legal 
protection by enabling courts to carefully review administrative decisions.”). 
 166.   Georgiev, supra note 111, at 993 (observing that, before 2004, consent decrees were a 
“uniquely American invention with no real pre-2004 parallels in either national or EU law.” But, 
since then,  settlements not only have become “entrenched” at the EU but lead to “gradual diffusion 
into the legal systems of a number of EU member states”). 
 167.   Id. at 994 (observing that, although the issue remains unsettled, third-party challenges may 
proceed in court).  But see Jenny, supra note 162, at 723 (observing that, to date, EU settlements 
“are very unlikely to be challenged in court”). 
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In such cases, judges need not embrace an expansive public law 
model of adjudication, or even reject more classical forms of 
adjudication that rely on reasoned argument.  But courts can, at a 
minimum, organize their proceedings to reduce confusion, raise concerns 
about conflicts between different parties with different legal entitlements, 
and ask those actors to explain their decisions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Judges reviewing the fairness of mass settlements brokered by 
private and public actors confront similar problems in all forms of 
government administration—alienation and capture.168  The fear in large 
private representative actions is that the class representative or counsel 
may sell out the absent members of the class in their own self-interest.169  
An analogous fear animates large government brokered settlements—
that a government prosecutor or regulator will similarly ignore the 
interests of the public or potential claimants, when settling with a 
criminal defendant or a regulated entity.170  In both cases, courts have 
been tasked with reviewing settlements to protect broader constituencies 
who otherwise lack the ability to directly participate in a trial or 
settlement that they depend upon for relief. 
Although many question whether court-oversight offers a sufficient 
safeguard against the risks of capture,171 there appears to be a growing 
movement around the world to give courts some role in the oversight of 
                                                          
 168.   Lahav, supra note 154, at 392 (“There are three central arguments against the 
administration of claims in the courts: alienation, capture, and error.”); Owen M. Fiss, The 
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1452 (1983). 
 169.   See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE JR, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND 
FUTURE 5 (2015) (“Because no individual class member typically has a fraction of the economic 
stake at risk that the plaintiff’s attorney has, the attorney’s actions and decisions are seldom closely 
monitored by the class members.”).  See also supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 170.   See, e.g., SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“[W]hen a public agency asks a court to become its partner in enforcement . . . , the court becomes a 
mere handmaiden to a settlement privately negotiated on the basis of unknown facts, while the 
public is deprived of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public importance.”); Stop 
Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016: Hearing on H.R. 5063, Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016).  The 
Stop Settlement Slush Fund Act, which attempts to bar the Department of Justice from entering into 
settlements that distribute funds to third-parties out of such concerns was reintroduced into the 
House this year as H.R. 732.  Bruce Kaufmann, Push to Enact Civil Justice Bills Follows Industry 
Playbook, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.bna.com/push-enact-civil-
n57982084551/. 
 171.   Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1044 (1997) (noting the “decline of judicial assertiveness” reflects a “more generalized 
pessimism about the administrative state”). 
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large settlements.  United States judicial innovations in massive private 
and public cases illustrate how judges may continue to shape the 
deliberation, fairness and efficiency of such actions by improving 
dialogue between courts, parties and the public. 
 
